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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is in a civil case from a ruling of the Seventh Judicial District Court, 
Carbon County, the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner presiding. As such, the Utah Supreme Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution forbids Insurers from 
demanding first dollar reimbursement of compensation paid to the Andersons from their third 
party wrongful death recovery where such reimbursement would completely abrogate the 
Andersons' recovery? 
This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. Esquivel v. Labor Comm. of Utah, 
2000 UT 66 % 11; 7 P.3d 777, 779. It was preserved below in the Andersons' Opposition to 
Insurers' Motion to Dismiss (R. 155). 
Whether the Andersons stated a cause of action against Insurers for application of 
equitable subrogation to disbursement of any wrongful death recovery in the action against 
the third party tortfeasors? 
This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. Esquivel v. Labor Comm. of Utah, 
2000 UT 66 Tf 11; 7 P.3d 777, 779. It was preserved below in the Andersons' Opposition to 
Insurers' Motion to Dismiss (R. 155). 
Whether the trial courts should determine the equitable distribution of any third party 
1 
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recovery where an employer seeks subrogation and assets are insufficient to make the 
wrongful death heirs whole? 
This is an issue of law reviewed for correctness. Esquivel v. Labor Comm. of Utah, 
2000 UT 66 If 11; 7 P.3d 777, 779. It was preserved below in the Andersons' Opposition to 
Insurers' Motion to Dismiss (R. 155). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Article XVI, Section 5. [Injuries resulting in death - Damages] 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be 
abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, except 
in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106 
Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of persons other than employer, officer, agent or 
employee of employer - Rights of employer or insurance carrier in cause of action -
Maintenance of action - Notice of intention to proceed against third party - Right to 
maintain action not involving employee-employer relationship - Disbursement of proceeds 
of recovery - Exclusive remedy. (Entire text set forth in addendum - attached) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 4, 1998, Karl Anderson was killed while in the course and scope of his 
employment with United Parcel Service ("UPS") (R. 129). Appellant Jody Anderson is the 
2 
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widow of Karl Anderson and the personal representative of his estate (R. 129). Mrs. 
Anderson commenced litigation on behalf of herself and her two children against the parties 
responsible for Karl's death but found those parties only insured for losses up to $ 100,000.00 
and with minimal other assets (R. 130). Recovery of the $100,000 would not make the 
Andersons whole. For example, Mrs. Anderson's expert estimated that merely the economic 
losses arising out of her husband's death were $926,434.00 (R. 168-171). 
Faced with no recovery for her losses and those of her minor children, Mrs. Anderson 
attempted to negotiate the worker's compensation lien with Liberty Mutual Insurance and 
UPS (R. 131). Despite UPS's fiduciary responsibilities for Mrs. Anderson's cause of action 
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(2)(a)(I), UPS refused to negotiate settlement of the case 
in good faith (R. 131). Rather, Liberty Mutual demanded its lien be paid in full before any 
disbursement to Karl Anderson's widow or minor children (R. 131). The result being Mrs. 
Anderson and her son would continue receiving worker's compensation, her daughter would 
receive nothing and the employer would receive all of the recovery after attorney's fees. 
Mrs. Anderson joined UPS and Liberty Mutual as involuntary plaintiffs and cross-
claimed for a declaratory judgment that their subrogation claim was controlled by Article 
XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution and the principles of equitable subrogation (R. 124). 
UPS moved to dismiss the cross claim which the lower court granted on May 31, 2002 (R. 
140) 
3 
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This appeal arises from an Order of Dismissal entered by the Honorable Bryce K. 
Bryner in the Seventh Judicial District Court for the State of Utah, Carbon County (R. 202). 
The underlying wrongful death action remains before the trial court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Determination of this appeal is governed by Utah's rules of statutory construction. 
Those rules demand the statutes and constitutional provisions at issue be given their plain 
meaning, be construed in accordance with their original intent, and avoid unnecessary 
constitutional conflict. The trial court's ruling which granted appellee insurers first dollar 
reimbursement failed to comply with any of these rules. On the other hand, appellants' 
appeal for application of equitable subrogation to third party wrongful death recoveries 
comports with them all. 
Application of equitable subrogation would prevent any double recovery as intended 
by Workers Compensation Act. Only equitable subrogation could prevent a double recovery 
either to the heirs of deceased workers, or to workers compensation insurers who have been 
paid premiums to undertake the risk of injury or death. Equitable subrogation would also 
continue to allow employers to pay no fault compensation to injured workers and protect 
employers from damage suits as intended by Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
Only application of equitable subrogation, moreover, would maintain the plain and ordinary 
meaning of "compensation" and "damages" as used in the WCA and Section 5. In contrast, 
4 
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the trial court's ruling places the WCA's reimbursement provision in direct conflict with 
Section 5. The trial court's ruling places limitations on a wrongful death recovery for 
"damages" which Section 5 strictly forbids. 
Accordingly, equitable subrogation must be applied to wrongful death recoveries from 
third parties. Where such a recovery makes the heirs whole, an employer or insurer would 
be entitled to excess funds to offset its compensation payments. However, if those heirs are 
not made whole, it is they who are entitled to damages from the third party tortfeasor. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH'S RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DICTATE 
EQUITABLE SUBROGATION MUST GOVERN THE DISTRIBUTION 
OF WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES PAID BY THIRD PARTIES TO 
HEIRS OF DECEASED WORKERS 
Resolution of this appeal is governed by certain well-defined rules under Utah law. 
First, Utah's Constitution and statutes "are to be construed according to their plain 
language." O'Keefe v. Utah St. Retirement Bd, 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998); Salt Lake 
City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850 (Utah 1994). Second, the goal of any such construction "is 
to give effect to the legislature's intent based on the purpose of the statute." Esquivel, 2000 
UT 66; 7 P.3d at 781. Finally, "[w]hen interpreting statutes, every effort should be made 
to interpret them as being consistent with the dictates of the constitution." City of Logan v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697, 700 (Utah 1990). Hence, "it is [the Supreme 
Court's] policy to interpret a statute if possible to avoid potential constitutional conflicts." 
5 
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Cole v. Jordan Sck Dist., 899 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1995). 
The parties' arguments must be governed by these principles. Here, the Andersons' 
proposed construction recognizes the plain meaning of the terms used in Utah's Constitution 
and the Utah Workers Compensation Act ("WCA"), whereas UPS and Liberty Mutual 
("Insurers") simply ignore terms they find contrary to their position. The Andersons' 
argument also comports with the intent of the WCA. Insurers, on the other hand, ignore the 
intent and purpose of the Act to seek only their own benefit. Finally, the Andersons' 
position is consistent with the dictates of the Constitution and the only construction which 
would avoid Constitutional conflict between Section 5 and the WCA. Therefore, as set forth 
more fully below, Utah's rules of statutory construction dictate equitable subrogation must 
govern the distribution of wrongful death damages under the WCA. 
A. THE PLAIN MEANING AND PURPOSE OF THE WCA'S 
SUBROGATION PROVISION IS TO PREVENT AN INJURED 
WORKER'S DOUBLE RECOVERY OF COMPENSATION IN 
ADDITION TO COMPLETE THIRD PARTY DAMAGES 
The Worker's Compensation Act has been the law in Utah since 1917. For injured 
workers, it is "the exclusive remedy against the employer." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(l). 
The Act provides compensation to injured employees, regardless of fault. The Act, however, 
does not eliminate an injured employee's ability to additionally sue third parties whose 
negligence caused their injuries. Yet, to prevent these two separate claims (one against the 
employer and the other against a third party) from resulting in a double recovery, Section 
6 
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34A-2-106(5) provides the employer a subrogation interest in the third party recovery to 
recover compensation paid to the injured employee. 
Specifically, 34A-2-106(5) directs any damages obtained in a third party action must 
be disbursed accordingly: (1) costs and attorneys' fees are paid; (2) "[t]he person liable for 
compensation payments shall be reimbursed;" and (3) any remaining damage proceeds are 
left for the injured worker and his dependents. According to this Court, "[t]he purpose of 
the right of reimbursement established by this section is only to prevent double recovery by 
the employee or his or her dependents." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bliss, 725 P.2d 1330, 1334 
(Utah 1986); Oliveras v. Caribou-Four Corners, Inc., 598 P.2d 1320, 1325 (Utah 1979); 
Esquivel v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT 66; 7 P.3d 777, 781. The purpose and intent of the 
provision is thus clear, to prevent double recovery of both compensation and complete third 
party damages. 
It should be further noted the WCA expressly distinguishes between "compensation" 
and "damages." Specifically, the Act provides that when injured, 
(a) the injured employee, or in the case of death, the employee's dependants, may 
claim compensation; and 
(b) the injured employee or the employee's heirs or personal representative may have 
an action for damages against the third person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(l). Article XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution uses the 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
same terms. Insurers attempt to bury any different meaning of the terms, but statutory 
construction demands they be given their plain and obvious meanings. The distinct meaning 
of "compensation" and "damages" has been described by this Court: 
Compensation is a concept wholly different from that of damages. Damages 
are based upon fault, are generally limited only by the findings and conscience 
of the jury, and in death cases are payable to heirs or personal representatives 
without regard to dependency. Compensation, on the other hand, generally 
has no relation to fault, is fixed or limited by statute, and is payable to 
dependents only. 
Henrie v. Rocky Mtn. Pack. Corp., 196 P.2d 487, 494 (Utah 1948); Oliveras, 598 P.2d at 
1323. Here, the WCA plainly distinguishes between the employee's claim against his 
employer for "compensation", and his claim for "damages" against a negligent third party. 
B. THE PLAIN MEANING AND PURPOSE OF SECTION 5 IS TO 
PRESERVE THE RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR 
WRONGFUL DEATH WHILE MAINTAINING AN EMPLOYER'S 
LIMITED LIABILITY FOR WORKPLACE INJURIES 
Since its original draft, the Utah Constitution has protected the right to sue and 
collect damages for wrongful death. In its original form, Article XVI, Section 5 ("Section 
5") read, 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall 
never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any 
statutory limitation. 
This Court has repeatedly stated the purpose of Section 5 is "to prevent the abolition of the 
right of action for a wrongful death 'whether in a wholesale or piecemeal fashion."' Malan 
8 
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v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 667 (Utah 1984); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1X1 P.2d 670, 684 
(Utah 1985); Hirpa v. IHCHosp., Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 794 (Utah 1997). 
In 1921, in specific response to passage of the WCA, Section 5 was amended. The 
amendment added, "except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is 
provided for by law." As stated by this Court, "[t]he purpose of the 1921 amendment to the 
Constitution was to permit the limitation of an employer's liability for fatal work-related 
injuries to the payment of death benefits under the Act." Oliveras, 598 P.2d at 1323; see 
also Star v. Industrial Comm 'n, 615 P.2d 436, 437 (Utah 1980); and Morrill v. J & M 
Constr. Co., Inc., 635 P.2d 88, 89 (Utah 1981). As clearly stated, the amendment was meant 
to limit an employer's liability to compensation. The amendment allowed the WCA to 
substitute an employer's payment of compensation for an injured worker's civil action 
against his employer for wrongful death. Berry, 111 P.2d at 680 (finding substitute 
legislative remedy must provide comparable protection to claimant's person or property). 
Otherwise, the amendment left damage recoveries untouched. Hence, damages for wrongful 
death still could not be limited or restricted in any way. 
Despite the narrow scope of the 1921 amendment, Insurers argue the amendment also 
granted the legislature, through the provisions of the WCA, the power to distribute wrongful 
death damages in third party actions. The trial court agreed ruling: "The constitutional 
provision is clear that recovery from the third party is not subject to limitation except in those 
9 
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instances where compensation is provided for by statute" (R. 200). As set forth below, this 
position ignores the plain distinction between a claim for compensation against an employer 
and a claim for damages against a third party. It ignores the intent and purpose of Section 
5 and the WCA and places the WCA subrogation provision in direct conflict with the 
Constitution. Thus, the trial court's ruling should be overturned. 
II. APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION IS REQUIRED TO 
PRESERVE THE PLAIN MEANING AND INTENT OF SECTION 5 
AND THE WCA, BOTH OF WHICH WOULD BE FRUSTRATED BY 
INSURERS' CLAIM TO FIRST DOLLAR REIMBURSEMENT FROM 
THE ANDERSONS' WRONGFUL DEATH RECOVERY 
Equitable subrogation must be applied to third party recoveries in wrongful death 
cases to avoid Constitutional conflict between Section 5 and the WCA's subrogation 
provision. Insurers argue, on the other hand, the WCA grants them first dollar 
reimbursement from any third party proceeds when they have paid compensation. Based on 
the exception in Section 5, "except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in 
death is provided for by law," Insurers argue the legislature was granted free reign in workers 
compensation cases to distribute wrongful death damages in any way it saw fit. 
Both the plain meaning and purpose of Section 5, as well as the intent and purpose 
of the legislature in passing the WCA, are maintained by the application of equitable 
subrogation, while ignored by Insurers' demand of first dollar reimbursement. There is no 
question the amendment to Section 5 allowed the WCA to substitute an employer's 
10 
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compensation payments for the heirs' wrongful death action against the employer. But it did 
not give the legislature the power to limit or restrict damages obtained in third party lawsuits 
for wrongful death. Rather, third party claims for damages remain governed by the pre-
amendment Section 5 which specifically states "the amount recoverable shall not be subject 
to any statutory limitation." 
The plain meaning of the terms "compensation" and "damages" have been established 
and differentiated by this Court. Section 5 dictates the Andersons' right of action to recover 
damages against a tortfeasor cannot be abrogated nor subject to statutory limitation. The 
amendment to Section 5 excepts one class of persons from this otherwise sweeping mandate, 
i.e. an employer who pays workers compensation. The plain language of the amendment, 
however, does not affect the Andersons' claim against a tortfeasor responding in damages. 
In the instance of a tortfeasor responsible for damages, the Andersons' right to recover 
explicitly "shall not be subject to statutory limitation." Insurers' application of the WCA's 
subrogation provision cannot be read as anything other than a statutory limitation on the 
Andersons' third party damage recovery. To avoid this unacceptable conflict, equitable 
subrogation must be applied. 
Equitable subrogation satisfies the intent and purpose of Section 5 and the WCA 
whereas first dollar reimbursement for Insurers does not. The intent and purpose of the 
WCA's subrogation provision is to prevent double recovery. It would be impossible for the 
11 
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Andersons to approach anything akin to a double recovery in this action. Specifically, the 
third party tortfeasors have a liability insurance limit of $100,000. Merely the economic 
losses in this case were professionally estimated at $926,434 (R. 168-171). After attorneys' 
fees in the third party action, the Andersons would recover approximately $65,000. In 
addition to these third party damages, the Andersons received their minimal compensation 
from Insurers. Sasha Anderson, daughter of decedent Karl Anderson, was fourteen (14) 
years old when her father was killed. She turned eighteen (18) on July 1, 2001. Conley 
Anderson, Karl Anderson's son, was twelve (12) years old when his father was killed. He 
will turn eighteen (18) on November 14, 2003. Mrs. Jody Anderson, their mother, received 
workers compensation benefits of $395 per week until Sasha turned 18, when the amount 
was reduced to $390 a week. Thus, the compensation paid by Insurers as a direct result of 
Sasha being a dependent under 18 was $5 a week. Insurers currently pay $5 in compensation 
benefits for Conley being under the age of 18. In total, Sasha received $845 for the death 
of her father. Conley will receive a total of $ 1,195. 
There is clearly no danger of the Andersons reaping a windfall or double recovery 
from the wrongful death of Karl Anderson. In this sense, this case is very similar to Hill v. 
State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988), wherein the tortfeasors' 
insurance was clearly inadequate to respond to plaintiff in damages. Regardless, State Farm 
demanded full reimbursement of expenses paid to plaintiff which this Court rejected. This 
12 
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Court taught, "[s]ubrogation is an equitable doctrine and is governed by equitable principles. 
This doctrine can be modified by contract, but in the absence of express terms to the 
contrary, the insured must be made whole before the insurer is entitled to be reimbursed from 
a recovery from the third-party tortfeasor." Id. at 866. This Court's holding in Hill 
demonstrates there is no danger of double recovery where insurance proceeds plus the 
maximum contribution possible from a third party tortfeasor do not make a victim whole. 
Double recovery will result, however, if Insurers are successful in convincing this 
Court the WCA and Section 5 dictate the reimbursement scheme they propound. Insurers 
collected premiums to cover the very risk of employee injury and/or death. Yet, if Insurers 
prevail, they will command all of the recovery in the third party action, while the children 
receive nothing from the tortfeasor. This is a result the Montana Supreme Court recently 
found unsupportable. In State Compensation Ins. Fund v. McMillan, 31 P.3d 347 (Mont. 
2001), the Supreme Court determined the State Fund was not entitled to subrogation until 
the victim was made whole. Otherwise, "[i]t is State Fund who would reap a windfall under 
this argument... 'The insurer has been paid for the assumption of the liability for the claim, 
and . . . where the claimant has not been made whole, equity concludes that it is the insurer 
which should stand the loss, rather than the claimant.'" Id. at 350; quoting Zacher v. 
American Ins. Co., 794 P.2d 335, 338 (Mont. 1990). Incredibly, Insurers ignore the irony 
of demanding double recovery in direct contravention of the very purpose of the WCA while 
13 
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leaving the actual victims of the tort with nothing. Application of equitable subrogation 
would prevent either party from obtaining a double recovery. 
Similarly, equitable subrogation satisfies the intent and purpose of Section 5 which 
is to permit limitation of an employer's liability to payment of compensation under the 
WCA. This Court's most recent pronouncement on Section 5 stated the provision was 
amended, "to permit the legislature to fix the amount of compensation . . . for wrongful 
death, while continuing to prohibit the complete abrogation of the right to recover." Laney 
v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, *34 n.9. Here again, the legislature was given the power to 
limit an employer's liability to compensation, but was not granted authority to similarly limit 
damages. The Andersons' position does not abrogate an employer's protection nor increase 
an employers' exposure. As set forth in Section 5, UPS's liability has been and remains 
limited to payment of compensation for injuries resulting in death as provided for by the 
WCA. 
Lastly, there is no support for Insurers' position that the legislature intended to make 
Insurers whole by requiring first dollar reimbursement at the expense of the actual victims 
of the wrongful death. The WCA is inherently an equitable arrangement. In exchange for 
limited liability, the employer pays compensation regardless of fault through a quick and 
inexpensive mechanism. It is simply unrealistic to argue the legislature intended this 
equitable arrangement to be twisted by Insurers to satisfy only their own interests. 
14 
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The Andersons recognize a number of courts have found their legislatures did 
abrogate subrogation's equitable foundations by statutorily granting insurance companies 
first dollar reimbursement.l However, as stated by this Court in Oliveras, "in neither of these 
cases was it necessary to reconcile a constitutional provision such as ours with the language 
of the applicable Workmen's Compensation Statute." Oliveras, 598 P.2d at 1325. In Utah, 
there is a constitutional provision protecting the Andersons' right to recover damages from 
third party tortfeasors which cannot be limited by statute. 
There is also the professed understanding the WCA did not statutorily abrogate 
equity, but was rather intended to preserve it. For example, in Lanier v. Pyne, 508 P.2d 38 
(Utah 1973), this Court stated in dicta, 
we think it reasonable to conclude that the rights conferred upon the insurance 
carrier should be regarded as secondary to the plaintiffs interest, and . . . 
should not be deemed to diminish or adversely affect the right of the injured 
employee to proceed against the third party. This is in accord with the purpose 
of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which is to benefit injured employees 
and not to impair or destroy natural rights which exist by reason of the 
common law to sue for the redress of wrongful acts. 
Id. at 253. Similarly, in Worthen v. Shurtleff& Andrews, Inc., 426 P.2d 223, 226 (Utah 
1967), this Court stated, "[i]t is more reasonable to assume that the Legislature intended this 
1
 See e.g. AIK Selective Self Ins. Fund v. Bush, 74 S.W.3d 251 (Ky. 2002); Graves v. 
Cocke Co., 24 S.W.3d 285 (Tenn. 2000); Cart II v. GeneralElec. Co., 506 S.E.2d 96 (W.Va. 
1998); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garry, 574 N.W.2d 895 (S.D. 1998); Neumann v. American 
Family Ins., 563 N.W. 2d 791 (Neb. 1997); Nelson v. Rothering, 496 N.W.2d 87 (Wis. 1993); 
and Waith v. North Dakota Work. Comp. Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1987). 
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application of the [WCA] which comports with its equitable purpose than one which would 
bring about a contrary result." These pronouncements are offered merely to show the WCA 
is equitable in its purpose, intent and design. That is why the WCA named Insurers as the 
"trustees" of the Andersons' action. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-106(2)(a)(I). It is 
incomprehensible the legislature intended the trustee to put its interests ahead of the 
beneficiaries, especially with such tragic consequences. 
There is simply no basis to assert the legislature attempted to broaden its authority 
under Section 5's amendment to include limitations on third party damages or to dispense 
with all equitable principles in the drafting of the WCA. It is more reasonable to assert the 
legislature did not intend insurance companies to attempt to justify their mendaciousness by 
claiming they had the legislature's blessing. Rather, Utah's Constitution and the WCA 
demonstrate an intent to do equity. 
Utah, hence, is akin to courts which have preserved the equitable foundations of 
subrogation and workers compensation schemes in interpreting their statutes. For example, 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled equitable principles still applied to the state's workers 
compensation statutes because, "subrogation is a matter of pure equity, and is never allowed 
where it would be inequitable to do so." Meehan v. Philadelphia, 136 A.2d 178, 181 (Pa. 
1957). Similarly, inBaio v. Commercial Unionlns. Co., 410 A.2d 502, 506 (Del. 1979), the 
Delaware Supreme Court held, "no matter what the form, subrogation is an equitable remedy 
16 
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and one who seeks it must, in turn, do equity. That applies in a subrogation claim brought 
under a Workmen's Compensation Statute." Likewise, the Arkansas Supreme Court found 
that even a statutorily created subrogation interest in the workers compensation carrier could 
never arise until the insured was made whole. General Accident Ins. Co. v. Jaynes, 33 
S.W.3dl61, 166 (Ark. 2000). 
In this case, applying equitable subrogation to third party wrongful death damage 
recoveries comports with the intent and purpose of both the WCA and Section 5 by 
preventing double recoveries; by preserving an employer's limited liability; and by upholding 
the equitable foundation of the WCA. In contrast, Insurers' construction accepted by the 
trial court has the actual, pragmatic effect of abrogating the third party wrongful death action 
of the Andersons who, absent Karl's death, would have had a lifetime of care, 
companionship and guidance. Under Insurers' proffered scenario, the Andersons are entitled 
to nothing for the death of their husband and father while Insurers collect premiums plus full 
reimbursement of any monies they paid out on those premiums. It is difficult to fathom the 
drafters of Section 5 and the WCA ever intended such an inequitable result. 
Accordingly, the Andersons stated a cause of action below for the application of 
equitable subrogation to any wrongful death damages recovered from the third party 
tortfeasors. Insurers' Motion to Dismiss should have been denied and the trial court's 
dismissal must be overturned. 
17 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT MUST DETERMINE EQUITABLE 
DISTRIBUTION OF WRONGFUL DEATH DAMAGES RECOVERED 
FROM THIRD PARTY TORTFEASORS 
As equitable subrogation must be applied to wrongful death recoveries from third 
party tortfeasors, it is the trial courts which must determine the equitable distribution of such 
recoveries. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-201, u[t]he court has exclusive jurisdiction 
of proceedings initiated by interested parties concerning the internal affairs of trusts. 
Proceedings which may be maintained under this Section are those concerning the 
administration and distribution of trusts, the declaration of rights, and the determination of 
other matters, involving trustees and beneficiaries of trusts." Thus, the trial courts must 
declare the respective interests of the parties in any third party recovery. 
Furthermore, the trial courts are vested with the power to demand those respective 
interests be defined equitably. Under Utah Code Ann. § 75-5-401, et seq., the trial courts 
have jurisdiction over the minor dependents' recovery from any third party settlement. As 
stated in the Editorial Board Comment to § 75-5-407, "[t]he section establishes a framework 
within which professionals, including the judge, attorney and physician, if any, may be 
expected to exercise good judgment in regard to the minor or disabled person who is the 
subject of the proceeding." Thus, the trial courts have the power to equitably adjust the 
interests of all parties to protect and preserve third party wrongful death recoveries. Only 
in such manner can the trial courts exercise their discretion under § 75-5-401, etseq. while 
18 
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still giving meaning to the provisions of the WCA. 
Accordingly, the trial courts can and must equitably determine the parties' interests 
in any third party recoveries. 
CONCLUSION 
Equitable subrogation must be applied to wrongful death recoveries from third party 
tortfeasors under the WCA's reimbursement scheme. Only equitable subrogation would 
prevent double recoveries. Furthermore, only equitable subrogation would comply with the 
Constitution's mandate to limit an employer's liability to compensation for wrongful death 
while placing no restrictions on the heirs' recovery of damages from third party tortfeasors. 
The trial court's grant of first dollar reimbursement to Insurers, on the other hand, ignores 
the plain meaning and intent of these provisions and places the WCA in intolerable conflict 
with Section 5. Therefore, equitable subrogation must be applied to wrongful death 
recoveries from third party tortfeasors. 
J DATED thisi^^day of November, 2002. 
SILVESTER & CONROY, L.C. 
Fred R. Silvester 
Spencer Siebers 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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34A-2-106 UTAH LABOR CODE 426 
34A-2-106. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of 
persons other than employer, officer, agent, or employee 
of employer - Rights of employer or insurance carrier in 
cause of action - Maintenance of action - Notice of 
intention to proceed against third party - Right to 
maintain action not involving employee-employer 
relationship - Disbursement of proceeds of recovery -
Exclusive remedy 
(1) When any injury or death for which compensation is 
payable under this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a 
person other than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of 
the employer 
(a) the injured employee, or, in case of death, the 
employee's dependents, may claim compensation; 
and 
(b) the injured employee or the employee's heirs 
or personal representative may have an action for 
damages agamst the third person 
(2)(a) If compensation is claimed and the employer or 
insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, 
the employer or insurance carrier 
(l) shall become trustee of the cause of action 
agamst the third party, and 
(n) may bring and maintain the action either m 
its own name or in the name of the injured 
employee, or the employee's heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), an employer or 
insurance earner may not settle and release a cause of action 
of which it is a trustee under Subsection (2)(a) without the 
consent of the commission 
(3)(a) Before proceeding against a third party, to give a 
person described in Subsections (3)(a)(i) and (n) a 
reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the 
proceeding, the injured employee or, m case of death, the 
employee's heirs, shall give written notice of the intention to 
bring an action agamst the third party to 
(l) the carrier, and 
(n) any other person obligated for the 
compensation payments 
(b) The injured employee, or, in case of death, the 
employee's heirs, shall give written notice to the carrier and 
other person obligated for the compensation payments of any 
known attempt to attribute fault to the employer, officer, 
agent, or employee of the employer 
(I) by way of settlement, or 
(n) in a proceeding brought by the injured 
employee, or, m case of death, the employee's 
heirs 
(4) For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding 
Section 34A-2-103, the inured employee or the employee's 
heirs or personal representative may also maintain an action 
for damages agamst any of the following persons who do not 
occupy an employee-employer relationship with the mjured 
or deceased employee at the time of the employee's injury or 
death 
(a) a subcontractor, 
(b) a general contractor, 
(c) an independent contractor, 
(d) a property owner, or 
(e) a lessee or assignee of a property owner 
(5) If any recovery is obtained agamst a third person, it 
shall be disbursed in accordance with Subsections (5)(a) 
through (c) 
(a) The reasonable expense of the action, including 
attorneys" fees shall be paid and charged proportionately 
against the parties as their interests may appear Any fee 
chargeable to the employer or carrier is to be a credit upon 
any fee payable by the mjured employee, or, m the case of 
death, by the dependents, for any recovery had agamst the 
third party 
(b) The person liable for compensation payments shall be 
reimbursed, less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in Subsection (5)(a), for the 
payments made as follows 
(l) without reduction based on fault attributed to 
the employer, officer, agent, or employee of the 
employer in the action against the third party if the 
combmed percentage of fault attributed to persons 
immune from suit is determined to be less than 
40% prior to any reallocation of fault under 
Subsection 78-27-39(2), or 
(n) less the amount of payments made 
multiplied by the percentage of fault attributed to 
the employer, officer, agent, or employee of the 
employer in the action agamst the third party if the 
combmed percentage of fault attributed to persons 
immune from suit is determined to be 40% or 
more prior to any reallocation of fault under 
Subsection 78-27-39(2) 
(c) The balance shall be paid to the mjured employee, or 
the employee's heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce 
or satisfy m full any obligation thereafter .accruing against 
the person liable for compensation 
(6) The apportionment of fault to the employer in a civil 
action against a third party is not an action at law and does 
not impose any liability on the employer The apportionment 
of fault does not alter or dimmish the exclusiveness of the 
remedy provided to employees, their heirs, or personal 
representatives, or the immunity provided employers 
pursuant to Section 34A-2-105 or 34A-3-102 for usuries 
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not 
An> court m which a civil action is pending shall issue a 
partial summary judgment to an employer with respect to the 
employer's immunity as provided in Section 34A-2-105 or 
34A-3-102, even though the conduct of the employer may be 
considered m allocating fault to the employer m a third party 
action m the manner provided in Sections 78-27-37 through 
78-27-43 1997 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND| 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
MAR 1 1 2C02 
FOR-
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
JODY ANDERSON, individually and 
as Guardian of her Minor Children, 
SASHA BREE ANDERSON and 
CONLEY KARL ANDERSON; 
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, an Ohio 
corporation; and LIBERTY MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Massachusetts company, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
JACOB THEODORE GREGORY, 
STEPHEN E. GREGORY, HERITAGE 
ENTERPRISES IV, an asset trust, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON UPS' AND LIBERTY 
MUTUAL'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 980700756 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The court heard oral argument on UPS' and Liberty Mutual' & Motion to Dismiss on January 11, 
2002. The court has read the memorandum and has considered the arguments of counsel and now 
issues this ruling. 
I. Background 
Mr. Anderson, the deceased husband of the plaintiff Jody Anderson, suffered a fatal car 
accident while he was in the scope of his employment with defendant UPS. UPS and its workmen's 
compensation carrier, Liberty Mutual, have paid compensation benefits to Mrs. Anderson. 
Mrs. Anderson filed this action on behalf of herself, as guardian of her children, and on behalf 
of UPS and Liberty Mutual, seeking damages for the alleged negligence of the defendants. 
She later filed a Cross-Claim against UPS and Liberty Mutual seeking a declaratory judgment 
finding: (1) UPS waived its right to statutory subrogation; (2) UPS can have no recovery under 
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equitable subrogation according to the doctrine of unclean hands; or in the alternative, (3) the court 
should allocate the distribution of proceeds from any Third Party Action in accordance with the 
principles of equitable subrogation. 
II. Positions of the Parties 
UPS and Liberty Mutual (hereinafter "Liberty") seek a ruling dismissing plaintiff Jody 
Anderson's cross-claim against them for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
and in support thereof allege: 
1. Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-106 is the legal remedy in a third-party recovery, and a carrier does 
not lose its subrogation rights when it attempts to apply this law. 
2. UPS and Liberty have no duty to appear in a civil action in order to protect their subrogation 
interest. 
3. UPS and Liberty owe no duty to Anderson other than the statutory reduction for costs and 
attorney fees. 
4. "Equitable Subrogation" is not appropriate in this case because statutory subrogation exists. 
5. The Utah Constitution is not frustrated by applying Utah's longstanding law of statutory 
subrogation. 
The Insurers claim they are entitled to first recover because there is a statutory provision in 
place, UCA 34A-2-106, which provides that attorney fees should first be paid, then reimbursement 
to the carrier who has paid compensation benefits, and the balance is to be then distributed to the 
plaintiffs. 
Mrs. Anderson claims that she should receive the first dollars from any recovery to make her 
and her children whole because the Utah Constitution provides that the right to recover damages 
shall not be abrogated, and that, according to Mrs. Anderson, is in conflict with the Workmen's 
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Compensation Act. To avoid this conflict Mrs. Anderson contends that the principles of equitable 
subrogation are appropriate in this case because any recovery will be minimal, and it appear that if 
the Compensation Act distribution scheme were followed, all of the recovery would go to the 
insurers. 
III. Ruling 
The court is persuaded that there is no conflict between the Utah constitutional provision 
(Article XVI, Sec. 5) and the distribution scheme under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The 
constitutional provision is clear that recovery from the third party is not subject to limitation except 
in those instances where compensation is provided for by statute. 
Although some states have recognized the principle of equitable subrogation in appropriate 
cases, no cases have been cited where Utah courts have adopted such a doctrine. Because a statutory 
scheme is in place which provides for the disposition of proceeds from a third party tortfeasor, this 
court declines to invoke the concept of equitable subrogation. 
The court also finds that UPS and Liberty Mutual did not waive their rights to statutory 
subrogation by failing to initiate suit against the defendants nor did they have a duty under Section 
34A-2-106 to appear in a civil action in order to protect their subrogation interests. There is no 
provision under Utah law requiring UPS or Liberty Mutual to enter an appearance or waive their 
rights to subrogation. Section 34A-2-106 (1) clearly provides that the insurance carrier or employer 
"... may bring and maintain the action..." The statute does not state that failure to do so will result 
in a waiver of subrogation interests. 
In summary, the court finds that the cross claim seeks relief contrary to Utah law and it 
therefore fails to state a cause of action. The motion to dismiss the cross claim is granted. 
DATED this 7 day of March, 2002. ^ _ ^ 
ce K. Bryner, Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 980700756 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail STEPHEN G. MORGAN 
PAYOR 
KEARNS BLDG., Eighth Floor 
136 S. Main 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Mail MICHAEL E DYER 
ATTORNEY 
77 WEST 2 00 SOUTH SUITE 4 00 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Mail ROBERT L. JEFFS 
ATTORNEY 
90 NORTH 100 EAST 
P.O. BOX 888 
PROVO UT 84603 
Mail FRED R. SILVESTER 
ATTORNEY 
230 S 5th E, STE 590 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102 
Mail KIRA M. SLAWSON 
ATTORNEY 
77 W 200 S, STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY UT--84-101 
Dated this <i^ day of -/Tj ft/y 20 j ) a . 
" - £ rfflViL&XiAT^I 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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Michael E. Dyer (3786) 
KiraM. Slawson(7081) 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-7900 
Fax: (801)521-7965 
Attorneys for UPS and Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JODY ANDERSON, individually ] 
and as Guardian of her Minor ] 
Children SASHA BREE ; 
ANDERSON and CONLEY KARL ] 
ANDERSON; UNITED PARCEL ] 
SERVICE, an Ohio corporation; ] 
and LIBERTY MUTUAL ] 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a ; 
Massachusetts company, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
JACOB THEODORE GREGORY, ] 
STEPHEN E. GREGORY, ; 
HERITAGE ENTERPRISES TV, ) 
an asset trust. ) 
) ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
) Civil No. 980700756 
( Judge: Biyce K. Bryner 
Defendants. 
This matter came for hearing before the court on the 11th day of January, 2002. Michael 
E. Dyer of Blackburn & Stoll, LC appeared on behalf of Co-Plaintiffs Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company ("Liberty Mutual") and United Parcel Service ("UPS"). Fred Silvester appeared on 
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behalf of Plaintiff Jody Anderson. The Court reviewed Liberty Mutual's Motion to Dismiss and 
supporting Memoranda, and the Plaintiff, Jody Anderson's, Memorandum in Opposition, and 
subsequently issued a written Ruling on March 9, 2002. Based upon the Ruling by the Court, it is 
hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Jody Anderson's cross-claim against 
Liberty Mutual and UPS fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice. The Court hereby determines that there is no just reason for delay, and 
therefore, further directs that this shall be a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) as to the Cross 
Claim of Jody Anderson against Liberty Mutual and UPS. 
DATED this^V_ day of Msfffo, 2002. 
BY THE COURT 
02^ 
Judge Bjyner A 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
was faxed and mailed this 31 day ofMftjeh, 2002, to: 
Fred R. Silvester 
Spencer C. Siebers 
Silvester & Conroy, LC 
230 South 5th East, Suite 590 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(801) 532-2270 
Robert L. Jeffs, Esq. 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
(801)373-8878 
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